Burke’s and Wollstonecraft’s theoretical conclusions about the French revolution.

 Burke’s and Wollstonecraft’s theoretical conclusions about the French revolution.

By Jasper Gentry,

1st year MA politics student at Edinburgh University

Introduction:

The French revolution sparked new possibilities for the reconstruction of the state. Mary Wollstonecraft and Edmund Burke both contend these ideas, prescribing their ideological preferences - conservatism and republicanism. Throughout this comparison, I start siding with Wollstonecraft’s republican views more as she not only has a more coherent and rounded argument, but she also provides a tangible solution rather than a simple defence. 

Edmund Burke

Born in 1729, Burke was a member of the House of Commons and is known for his founding conservative views. His epistolary reflections on the French Revolution brought him rhetorical power and were massively popular. Being from a wealthy background and knowing many connections, Burke supported and cherished monarchies, traditions, and culture and ultimately opposed the French revolution. His letter ‘reflections on the revolutions in France’ (1790) offers attacks on the revolutionaries and, indirectly, offers a prescriptive manifesto for conservatism. Three broad principles can be elucidated from it: firstly, a belief in organicism, the idea of the organic nature of society and its progressive generational growth, consequentially prescribing a pro-establishment and anti-radicalistic agenda. Secondly, Burke establishes that society is inherently imperfect, thus, pessimistically alluring that radical regime changes to achieve a ‘utopian’ society are misconcepted. Thirdly, Burke has a scepticism about change, putting faith in the status-quo rather than abstract principles. Ultimately, these core principles are a preliminary value system by which Burke argues for institutions, tradition, organic change, and stability. Ironically, this is why Edmund Burke enjoys the unusual distinction of being both a revolutionary and a conservative at the same time (Mazlish, 1958).

Mary Wollstonecraft

Born in 1759 Mary Wollstonecraft was a strong feminist, republican, and firm critic of Edmund Burke. Her epistolary response to Edmund Burke’s ‘Reflections on the revolutions in France’ with a letter titled ‘A vindication of the rights of men’ (1790) offered a different and supportive perspective on the French revolution, promoting republican non-domination and feminist egalitarianism by emphasizing the importance of human rationality and reason. Her views on women as metaphorical slaves to the patriarchy, through environmental, educational, and social domination links to her republican non-domination ideals that ask for ‘virtue among equals’ (Ferguson, 1999). Wollstonecraft is a powerful critic of Burke in her letter, offering a contrasting perspective, and emphasizing her disparate world, one of poverty and discrimination, which is very different to that of Burke.

On institutions

Burke and Wollstonecraft view the roles of institutions differently. Burke, being conservative and pro-establishment wished to preserve institutions. Thus, he believed when you entirely disposed of historical institutions, such as the Church or Parliament, it caused instability as the delicate eco-system steers with “no compass to govern” (Burke, 1996). Contrarily, Wollstonecraft, instead of providing a prescriptive counterargument, critiques the “venerable pillars of our constitution”. She claims they are not “regulated by any fixed maxims” and “undisputed rights” incompetently run by the “barbarous monarchy” (Wollstonecraft, 1995) demonstrating that these institutions aren’t divine moral stalactites, but instead are dictated, unbalanced, and fundamentally capricious bodies. Already, a chief distinction is made between the two, they have a clear differing perspective on the necessity, benefit, and competency of institutions. Burke places trust in these institutions, seeing them in a positive light and a means preserving wisdom, convention, and, most importantly, stability. Wollstonecraft, contrary to this, distrusts institutions, instead of seeing it in a negative light as a source of outmoded incompetency. I believe that looking further into the principles of both theorists will further elucidate their differences.

Burke’s notion of organicism and Wollstonecraft’s non-domination are very different. Burke’s emphasis on a metaphorical “partnership not only between those who are living… those who are dead, and those who are to be born” (Burke, 1996) shows a longer-term view that convention, tradition, and practical wisdom must manifest itself distilled through time, ‘growing’. Wollstonecraft critiques this, claiming that one can trace institutions back in time until it “reverts to another” and “chaos becomes the base of the mighty structure” (Wollstonecraft, 1995). Wollstonecraft argues institutions came from the “infancy of society” where “customs were established by lawless power” (Wollstonecraft, 1995), a time of barbarism and thus are socially and politically dominating. Comparatively, Wollstonecraft’s republican perspective and critique of institutions are incongruent with Burke’s organicist notion that justifies support for institutions. It shows us that their principles are different, essentially using different methodologies to achieve their respective conservative and republican aims.

Burke and Wollstonecraft’s contrasting opinions on institutions could be explained by their own contextual nuance. Many look to Burke’s social standing as a wealthy male politician as justification for his conservative views, with Wollstonecraft stating that Burke is “enjoying the wages of falsehood… of fifteen hundred pounds per annum” (Wollstonecraft, 1995). Thus, she insinuates his words are financially motivated. Similarly, Wollstonecraft’s poorer background can offer reason to her view on institutions. Her emancipatory writing can be explained by her environmental upbringing, seeing it as essentially ‘broken’ needing to be fixed. Whilst Burke, from arguably more ‘privileged’ background, sees his environment as ‘functioning’ as he, himself, reaps the financial and social benefits of the status-quo. Burke’s own context makes me side with Wollstonecraft more, however, Importantly, I believe their social and political position will only influence and not determine their political theory. 

On change

Burke and Wollstonecraft both share empirical similarities by both embracing change. Burke although conservative, believes that “subordinate contracts for objects… may be dissolved at pleasure;” (Burke, 1996) meaning he accepts and supports laws being altered and changed. Similarly, change for Wollstonecraft is a priority as a feminist and republican critic. Wollstonecraft’s rhetoric calling upon all French “systems of government” and criticizing “their inbred sentiments” (Wollstonecraft, 1995) consequentially fuels the urgency for change. Although both political thinkers are at an antithesis, empirically Burke and Wollstonecraft both agree that ‘change’ must happen. Granted, this makes sense as contradictions to conservatism mean a true conservative would need to “reject the change, and continue to reject it” (James, 2013), but for Burke, he accepts it. Therefore, although a strange connection, Burke and Wollstonecraft, from an empirical perspective, both believe change is necessary. Personally, although both do believe in change, I believe it is the means of change that will be a key distinction.

However, ‘change’ is a very subjective term that offers varying definitions, processes, and requirements, Burke and Wollstonecraft have differing conceptions on how they view ‘change’. Burke concludes that the state “ought not to be considered” (Burke, 1996) at all, instead, change must only occur through small alterations of law, rather than radical change. Burke famously claimed that “liberty won’t last” (Burke, 1996) after the French revolution. For Wollstonecraft, however, the failings of “these systems of government” which are “opposite and incompatible” (Wollstonecraft, 1995) offer the very justification for the urgency for change. Burke’s very “gradualist reform” has a very sharp distinction between Wollstonecraft’s “ideologically driven, totalising, revolutionary transformation” (Hampsher-Monk, 2012). This distinction shows us that Wollstonecraft empathises more with the motives for revolution, seeing it as a necessary good. Personally, I agree with Wollstonecraft here as, quite clearly, the systems of government were crumbling and, therefore, totalising transformation is the most agreeable way for change.

Furthermore, Burke’s negative conception of revolutions is confusingly muddled by his previous support for the Glorious and American revolutions. Many point to different reasons for his opposition to the French revolution. For example, his personal biases such as his clear adoration for the “full of life and splendour and joy” (Burke, 1996) Dauphines, can be seen as Burke justifying his adoration for her. However, Burke claims that the French revolution wasn’t like the previous revolutions as it was more ‘radical’, it being wider and a more holistic regime change. He justified the Glorious revolution claiming it was a necessary corrective in the British system, however, how do we still distinguish between ‘revolutionary’ changes and ‘conservative’ changes if no prescriptive definitions are given? Wollstonecraft, contrastingly, prescribes her clear republican vision to “meliorate their [women’s] conditions” (Wollstonecraft, 1995), although lacks clarity on how to achieve this. Ultimately, I believe Burke underpins his own arguments more here, his contravening opinions on revolutions show us the lack of coherency in his argument, further justifying the accusations of his personal affiliations with the monarchy.

On abstract reasoning

‘Change’, as identified, is concepted very differently; Burke’s organic change is vastly different from Wollstonecraft’s more radical. This logic extends to their conceptions of abstract ideas. Burke proclaims that the revolution was “stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction” (Burke, 1996), meaning that the revolution lacked “orderly way” and “deliberation to the reasons” (Burke, 1996) for revolution. Thus, Burke sees the revolutions ‘abstract’ reasonings as lacking substantiation, a priori, and order, something which contravenes his conservative views. Wollstonecraft, however, sees the revolution’s abstract reasoning positively. From an emancipatory view, radical ‘change’ is one way of changing the social conditions rapidly, especially to a republican system. Burke sees abstract reasoning as negative and Wollstonecraft positively. This distinction is due to their differing approaches to human reason.

Burke and Wollstonecraft approach human rationality, passion, and reason from very different perspectives. Burke thought the revolution would “resort to anarchy” (Burke, 1996) and can be explained by his Hobbesian perspective on human rationality. Hobbes, a political theorist who saw human nature in the state of nature (pre-state conditions) as inherently anarchic, had little trust in humans’ individual abilities to rationalise and reason. Burke saw the logic in this, stating that “each man’s stock of reason is small”, seeing a “poverty of conception” in the revolutionaries disputing their “legitimating powers of human will – individual or collective” (Burke, 1996). Burke’s view that human reason is weak and unstable provides a preliminary justification for all his notions - institutions and abstract reasoning, as he believes that it is more ‘stable’ for practical wisdom to be learned over generations, rather than the hasty passion of human reason that can be illegitimating. Contrary to this, Wollstonecraft believed in human reason stating that “the perfection of our nature and capability of happiness, must be estimated by the degree of reason, virtue, and knowledge” (Wollstonecraft, 1995). Here, she has trust and belief in humans’ ability to reason (like Locke), even claiming it has flourishing abilities to “educate, tame, and control” (Hampsher-Monk, 2012) in a “normatively progressive and virtuous fashion” (Wollstonecraft, 1995). This could discern the root of her republican values that seek to empower the individual through non-domination. Therefore, Burke’s Hobbesian perspective differs from Wollstonecraft’s more Lockean perspective.

Furthermore, Wollstonecraft was deeply wary of Burke’s arguments which seemingly “attempted to buttress political, economic, gender, or other hierarchies by interpreting existing social reality as the reification of human nature” (Wollstonecraft, 1995). Epistemologically their distinction here shows us that Burke has a foundationalist scope different from that of Wollstonecraft, who has an interpretive one. Burke and Wollstonecraft examine the French revolution from different epistemological perspectives, thus dividing their opinions on what they see as real and deducing from there. Unsurprisingly, their opinions differ as, epistemologically, they interpret the world differently. 

Conclusion

Conclusively, from the comparison and analysis of Burke and Wollstonecraft, their background, epistemology, values, and ideology are vastly different. Burke’s view on human reason, an underlying principle, is pessimistic, seeing human reason as essentially primitive, unstable, and treacherous. On a personal level, this outlook doesn’t appeal to me as someone who looks positively in life. Furthermore, although I quibble with Wollstonecraft’s republican ideas, such as its applicability, Wollstonecraft, provides a solution rather than a defence. It is clear that at the time, the prevailing state and institutions were crumbling, it is solutions that are needed not the status-quo. Therefore, Wollstonecraft’s more radical conceptions of ‘change’ appeal to me as I believe it is the only way to make ‘real’ lasting change. Small alterations can be undone but large shifts actually change the political circumstances as seen with most revolutions.

On an evaluative level, Wollstonecraft as a critic provides a decently coherent and substantiated response compared with Burke’s double-standards and social status, underpinning his arguments.

Bibliography:

Alexander, James. 2013, “The Contradictions of Conservatism.” Government and Opposition. Vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 594–615.  

Berges, S, & Berges. S 2013, The Routledge Guidebook to Wollstonecraft's a Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Taylor & Francis Group, London. Pp – 69-74.

Burke, E. 1996, “Princeton Readings in Political Thought: Essential Texts since Plato”, Edited by Cohen, M, & Fermon, N (eds). Princeton University Press, Princeton. Pp 349-355

Ferguson, Susan. 1999, “The Radical Ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft.” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique, Quebec City. Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 427–450. 

Hampsher-Monk, Iain. 2012, “Reflections on the Revolution in France,” in Dwan, D. and Insole, C. (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Companions to Literature), Pp. 195–208. 

Mazlish, Bruce. 1958, “The Conservative Revolution of Edmund Burke.” The Review of Politics, New York City. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 21–33. 

Wollstonecraft, M. 1995, Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Men and a Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hints. Edited by S. Tomaselli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). Pp- 5-62, 79-234.