Were Russia’s claims for justified annexation of the Crimean Peninsula legitimate?
Author: Jasper E. GentryIntroduction
On 20th February 2014, Russia officially declared its occupation of the Crimea after an all-night meeting was held with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, surrounding the actions needed to secure Crimea. Mr. Putin concluded that he was forced “to begin the work to bring Crimea back to Russia”[1]. Consequentially, on the 27th February 2014 Ukraine accused Russia of an “armed invasion and occupation”[2] as gunmen wearing unmarked uniforms secretively took control over airports and surrounding border posts in Crimea. Kremlin-backed forces seized control of the Crimean government and quickly set up an interim pro-Russian Crimean government without a mandate. After a decisive ‘96.77%’[3] referendum vote for secession from Ukraine to Russia; in which the west denounced as illegal, the EU set sanctions on Russia. However, the most significant conflicts that occurred were between the pro-Russian separatists and pro-EU Ukrainians, which sought deeper EU integration. The conflict was essentially evoked by differing loyalties surrounding Russia and the EU, this relating to the split Russian and Ukrainian demographic within Crimea. Although tensions have now relaxed “Crimea remains under Russian jurisdiction”[4] with no international recognition. Despite condemnation from the West for breaking several international treaties, one year on from the official annexation Crimea is entirely peaceful with no violence or activism; as put by the BBC the “transfer from Ukraine to Russia has become an accepted fact of life”[5].
‘Were Russia’s claims for justified annexation of the Crimean Peninsula legitimate?’ is a rather poinient idea to explore in a crossroads era where Russia's interventionism is seemingly culminating greater international attention. Russia's “justifications for legitimate annexation”[6] at the United Nations Security Council, where 'Western hypocrisy' was hailed, gives notion to a seemingly future increase in Russian assertiveness, which may question the future of Russian relations on a global level.
Crimea is a particularly important case study to investigate when explorinng Russian international politics as it gives insights into the competency of the international community in maintaining international peace and of protecting international security. Russia clearly broke ‘Article 2(4)’[7] of the UN Charter, prohibiting states from the use of force against the territorial integrity of another. This makes Russia’s actions illegitimate by international law. However, the concept of legitimacy is not so simple, as it is a term of relativism, there is no model legitimate body or base within politics that provides a clear-cut definition of what legitimacy is. Ultimately, one may be able to describe ‘legitimacy’ as an absolute concept. It is therefore important to give agency to the post-soviet decade whereby the move towards a world of interdependence and cooperation occurred and whereby Russia could act unilaterally instead of multilaterally. This shift is largely due to the failure of the Bush and Blair era within Iraq which left the world without “belief in the positivity of interventionism”[8]. After Iraq, countries such as Russia, therefore, saw an opportunity to act unilaterally without conceding moral ground or jeopardy. Effectively, the West, having won the Cold War had given up the moral high ground for interventionism, meaning aspiring powers could assert national interests in the guise of internationalism due to the West’s failure’s in becoming multilaterally ‘legitimate’. The annexation is symptomatic of the global political situation, and so may ultimately foretell the role of Russia in the future.
Methodology
Russia’s legitimacy is very questionable, especially in a world that is so opposed to regimes which do not align themselves with the liberalist model in the current world order. We must consequentially question all perspectives and sides of the discussion. This will formulate a better understanding of what legitimacy is and ultimately if “Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula was legitimate or not”. I will look at the Russian perspective and their claims to the region. Contrary to this I will also look at the Ukrainian perspective and see if their argument de-legitimises the Russian justification. Lastly, I will look at the Western perspective; the West is defined as ‘IGO’s; MEDC world superpowers geographically West (such as the US and Europe) and international law’[9]. The different perspectives will foretell if the West is being hypocritical in criticising Russia, and therefore if Russia is legitimate or not.
The conflict from a macro view
When Western historians seek to understand what the key to perceived Russian aggression is in Crimea, no better explanation can be given than that of Winston Churchill’s famous observation of Russia made in 1939. That key is ‘Russian national interests’[10] which seven years later led Winston Churchill to the conclusion, ‘I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness’[11]. Russia’s obstinacy to hold on to the peninsula especially after backlash from the international community demonstrates to us first and foremostly that national interests, as highlighted by Winston Churchill’s observation, are vital to why Russia annexed Crimea. Russia’s national interests may be generally defined as: ‘The interest of a state, usually as defined by its government’[12] and, as Abdul Aziz defines, “the general, long term and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving.”[13]. From a Russian perspective, the annexation of Crimea was, of course, highly legitimate as it caters for Russia’s geopolitical interests, such as the port of Sevastopol. Yet, all this proves is that legitimacy is a subjective relativist concept which is relative to a state’s own interests, which is the problem in assessing the viability of Russia’s claims. In a world that is so interconnected and interdependent via commerce and the movement of people, the West believes that a state can not simply cater for its own national interests but must have a greater global view. We must, therefore, investigate Russia’s legitimacy not just from the Russian perspective, but from the Ukrainian and Western perspective as well.
The Russian perspective generally believes the annexation of Crimea is legitimate due to the clear economic and geostrategic benefits Crimea provides. The port city of Sevastopol has direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and will ultimately provide Russia with a greater naval capacity in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea[14]. Russia wants more military power so that it may assert greater influence over Europe[15]. The geostrategic; (“a type of foreign policy that is guided principally by geographical factors”)[16], and economic advantages legitimise Russian action from a Russian perspective.
Clear geostrategic interests are shown, thus leading to the belief that Russian interests are solely one of national interested benefit rather than impassioned sentiment. Yet, it does not matter if Russia’s actions are for national interested reasons or not; indeed, this is morally illegitimate, however, according to legitimate ‘law’, having substantiated evidence is most crucial into proving a state’s legal legitimacy. Therefore, if Russia has the appropriate justifications and evidence for the annexation, then its actions will be legitimate. This is a reason why we have not seen any interventions due to the principle of ‘morality’ whereby states lack the legal legitimacy to intervene.
Russia’s Claims
Russia’s ‘Jus ad Bellum’ or claims for war in annexing Crimea was discussed in the United Nations Security Council[17]. Russia led to believe that the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula had not acted contrary to international law. Russia initially said that it had “annexed Crimea in defence of Russian speakers”[18]. However, following this Russia shifted its justification and claimed “annexation upon request of military assistance”[19] by the democratically-elected Ukrainian government. Later, Russia argued that it simply never used military force, rather, that it was Ukrainian militia’s that stormed Ukrainian military bases and government buildings. Finally, Russia argued that the Crimean annexation was ‘just’ through a clear pro-secession referendum that took place in Crimea. Russia changed its claims frequently this immediately showing that Russia did not believe it had enough justification to annex Crimea.
Russia’s claims were criticised by the West with threats of “economic and political isolation”[20]. Since legitimacy is a subjective concept, alignment of beliefs between global states is a way in which political action may be deemed legitimate. By this comment, the West clearly believe that if a state were to not politically act externally with the agreement of all states, then it may be deemed illegitimate due to the state not aligning its actions with others. However, the United Nations Security Council’s criticism of Russia’s illegality in breaking treaties elucidates how differing political agendas have caused the concept of legitimacy to become blurred[21]. The difference in Russia and the West’s opinion on the conflict shows us, again, how legitimacy is a subjective concept. Russia’s actions would therefore only be legitimate if Russia aligned its actions to that of the West’s, which will be unlikely due to Russia’s differing political agenda to that of the Wests. Russia’s actions are illegitimate in this context.
Furthermore, Russia clearly had to justify its national interests with claims, in which seemingly changed frequently. If it did have any impassioned sentiment then the West would not be so harsh in criticizing Russia’s actions, but instead would criticise both Russia and Ukraine. However, as determined earlier, the validity of the claims Russia made is what is important. The claims expound if Russia were acting with legal legitimacy or not and insight into ‘if Russia is legitimate or not in annexing Crimea?’.
The Ukrainian perspective
Understanding the perspective of Ukrainians is key to determining if the Russian perspective is legitimate. Since the post-Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukrainian anti-Russian sentiment has grown exponentially with Ukraine seeking ‘greater EU relations’[22]. Historically, Ukraine was Soviet-influenced, however, in recent years Ukraine has undergone increasing westernisation. For example, Ukraine’s President (25 February 2010 – 22 February 2014) Viktor Yanukovych pursued a “$15 billion deal”[23] in 2013 with the EU with the intention of integrating Ukraine more into the EU. This is one reason why the Ukrainian perspective sides largely with international law and Western values due to its politics undergoing ‘Westernization’. Ukraine geographically is caught between two regional superpowers (Russia and the European Union) thus causing Ukrainian politics to have to choose loyalties between Russia and Europe. Ukraine’s increasing ‘Westernization’ has been met by retaliation from Russia, who believes the EU is their enemy[24]. However, this claim is from ‘Russia Today’, a source showing Russian bias and so may wish to promote Russian ideals, instead of a neutral outlook. Ukraine was advised by the West not to seek greater ‘westernisation’ because of fears of this[25]. The West even saying that they believe it shows “antagonization”[26] from Ukraine, however Russia’s geographical proximity to Ukraine does not give Russia the right to spread its power and influence over it, especially upon concerns of its westernization. The unforeseen threat of Ukraine and consequentially the sudden response by Russia elucidates that Russia acted in Crimea because Ukraine was becoming a threat, rather than it being for morally legitimate reasons.
Ukraine, in response to the annexation, argued that Russia’s actions were illegitimate and that it had not coi with international law. Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine Nationalists) calling it a “gross violation of international law”[27] but with a biased Ukrainian outlook on the issue. Ukraine’s governance claimed that its sovereignty had been “violated by the action of annexation”[28]. It therefore had its sovereignty, which is protected under the UN charter, infringed. This is especially valid since both Russia and Ukraine are signatories of the Charter of the United Nations. If we go by international law, it is clearly not legal as from the outset Russia annexing Crimea contravenes Ukraine’s internal sovereignty. Contrary to this, it is also the United Nations’ duty to ‘protect state sovereignty’[29]. By the UN not enforcing its duty it delegitimises its moral legitimacy and its power to do so. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organisation tasked to “maintain international security”[30], however, it does not enforce what ‘legitimacy’ is in this case. It abstained from criticizing prompting the US[31] and EU[32] to set sanctions due to the lack of a formal response. ‘legitimacy’ is a concept that can only be valid if it is enforced, if it is not, the UN charter loses its ‘legitimacy’ allowing Russia the guise to do what it pleases without fear of economic or political action. However, the United Nations is an inter-governmental organisation that spans 193 states in the world, therefore it must remain impartial to disputed conflicts, this making it difficult for there to be a body or organisation that enforces what legitimacy is.
The Western perspective
In the West, IGOs such as the EU and states such as the UK and US rebuked the actions of Russia[33]; William Hague calling it a “grave threat to Ukraine”[34]. However, interestingly states such as Germany “did not punish Russia’s actions immediately”[35], instead, they waited. This is because of regional economic power. As identified by Tim Marshall Russia’s current regional economic power in Europe means that many European countries are dependent on Russia’s natural gas resources[36]. Germany is the most reliant on Russia; in 2015 “36 million tonnes, or almost 40 percent of oil imports”[37] to Germany were from Russia. The dependency sees an asymmetry in power between Germany and Russia with Russia having the ability “to stop the taps” and shut down European power[38]. Germany, therefore, would not wish to seek drastic action against Russia due to the fear of economic repercussions[39]. This tells us a lot about contemporary legitimacy today. The concept of legitimacy is highly influenced by the interests of each state. No state wishes to use interventionism due to their own national security being challenged through commerce, as such with Germany and the fear of Russia ‘shutting off the taps’. Therefore, legitimacy is clearly a concept that is only protected when aligned to a state’s national interests, rather than a concept which is grounded in the West’s political agenda.
Demographic argument:
Self-defence of Russian nationals
Russia’s claims for justified action were through a ‘self-defence’ of its people. The book ‘Prisoners of Geography’ states that “The Kremlin has a law that compels the government to protect ‘ethnic Russians’”[40]. Although ‘Prisoners of Geography’ takes a largely Western perspective on the annexation of Crimea; especially because its publisher ‘Scribner’ is an American profit-making publication company that wishes to maximise profit through popularity by, therefore, siding with ‘Western’ ideals rather than being neutral; the annexation did occur on Ukraine territory. Crimea’s demography is largely disputed between self-proclaimed Russian natives and Ukrainians, accurate figures are difficult to come by[41]. Russian figures state that there are ‘65%’[42] native Russians, whilst Crimean Tartars state that there are less than ‘30%’[43] (due to ethnic Russian’s not claiming ‘Russian’ identity), the figure is simply unknown. However, the 65% figure claimed by Russia, is not a verified figure. Interestingly, the figure lies comfortably in the ‘majority’ bracket, a figure which is undeniable for the West. Due to the lack of internationally verified evidence, the West accepts this figure[44]. Russia, taking advantage could easily “justify [annexation], by claiming that Russian communities that are being discriminated against”[45]allowing Russia to protect its ‘Russian natives’ within Crimea. Russia claimed “It is necessary in order to protect Russian nationals from the chaos of the Euromaidan riots”[46] occurring after the exile of Viktor Yanukovych. This provides the easiest way for Russia to align its own national interests to that of the West’s, by stating an unprovable fact. Russia legitimised their annexation through aligning its actions with international law, saying it “was necessary to rescue them from targeted persecution at the hands of pro-Ukrainian extremists”[47], however, the lack of clarity regarding Crimean demographics neither legitimises or delegitimises Russia’s actions.
The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
Russia’s claim of legitimacy was not easily disprovable by the West due to a lack of clarity regarding Crimean demographics; instead, the West delegitimised Russia’s annexation through other legal means. ‘The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances’[48] being the most notable, a document protecting Ukraine’s internal sovereignty. However, Russia was following ‘international law’ which is binding. Russia’s annexation is therefore ‘legal according to international law’[49], as a state may protect its nationals living abroad by law. Similarly, the West’s hesitant response was met with a harsh critique by Russia[50]. The West understands that it would be acting hypocritically if they were to seek drastic action. Past interventions by the West such as Iraq and Afghanistan were because of national interests and weren’t even legitimate[51] due to the US ignoring the UN’s advice. The West threw away their moral high ground during their unsuccessful interventions, which in turn allows Russia to annex Crimea legitimately and without criticism.
Unsubstantiated claims
As a result, the West needed to delegitimise Russia’s claims instead of criticising the action. The West alleged the Russian perspective lacks suitable evidence to claim ‘self-defence’ with no evidence of discrimination except Ukrainian threats and a Russian language ban[52]; which in turn the West advised Ukraine not in doing and shows antagonization[53]. Yet it is important to note that Russia’s claims have been criticised by equally “unsubstantiated”[54] claims by the West. The West claims that Russian citizens were not discriminated against, which is an unsubstantiated claim. Again, the idea of absolute legitimacy is delineated here, both the West and Russia have relied on unsubstantiated claims. This showing Russia’s and the West’s illegitimate nature.
Unsubstantiated claims can only be substantiated with evidence, in which Russia has clearly hidden as shown by the unverified demography of Crimea. The Ukrainian perspective in disagreement with Russia’s ‘self-defence’ claim highlighted Russia’s lack of willingness to invite observers to investigate Russian discrimination in Crimea[55]. Ukrainians believe that Russia’s abstaining is evidence for the falsity of the Russian claim, this, therefore, highlighting its ‘unsubstantiated’ nature. Russia blocked the OSCE military observers from entering Crimea[56]. Not only does this show us that Russia was hiding something, but it also shows their clear acknowledgement of their illegitimacy. Therefore, this makes the Russian claims illegitimate.
Interpretation
The West then went on to claim that the Russian interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, a state will “defend its citizens”[57] “if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN”[58], was taken to an extreme. Even if the discrimination of ethnic Russians in Crimea had occurred, such targeting does not constitute an “armed attack” against Crimea. Although clearly taken to an extreme, the UN charter sets out general rules which may be ‘interpretable’[59] by states. Theoretically, if Russia were to use this to their advantage it is serving many national geostrategic interests such as ownership of the port of Sevastopol and regions of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia may interpret the article whatever way it likes; however, it is the fact that Russia did not act in realpolitik (the political abstain from moral and ethical premises) but legitimised its actions via international law that makes Russia legitimate.
Referendum
Right to self-determination
The referendum in Crimea unsurprisingly sees overwhelming support for independence[60]. Russia’s “right to self-determination”[61] (Chapter 7 of the UN charter) allows it to legitimise its actions by ‘protecting’ Crimean’s from Ukraine, who refuses to legitimise the referendum. The Kremlin speculated that the Crimean referendum is the same case as the Kosovo referendum. In Kosovo a 99.8%[62] vote for independence occurred giving the West justification for intervention. On 16th March 2014, Russia boasts a 96.77% independence vote and an 83.1% turnout rate[63]. This giving Russia the justification for the annexation of Crimea.
The West delegitimised this referendum quickly with the US president, Barack Obama stating “it would never be recognised by the US’’[64]. Powers other than Russia have treated ‘legitimacy’ as needing to be universally accepted. Although the Russian perspective claims that it acted in a way that abided with international law due to the referendum result, the West’s dis-acknowledgement of the referendum ultimately means that Russia is illegitimate no matter the referendum’s legality or not. Russia has not aligned its actions to the West’s and therefore is illegitimate.
Vladimir Putin’s popularity
The referendum caused much domestic support for Vladimir Putin[65]. According to Western sources, Vladimir Putin’s popularity rate grew to ‘87%’ in Russia after the Crimean Referendum ([66];[67];[68]). This proved vital for internal Russian politics as it proved not only Russia’s strength and power but also Russia’s increasing voice on the global stage; making Russia “great again”[69], in which Vladimir Putin promised. Thus, one cannot write off the beneficial possibilities the annexation of Crimea has for Vladimir Putin’s own internal political benefit. If the annexation did occur for popularity interests rather than those that were legitimate then it highly delegitimises Russia’s actions, as it shows clear non-conformity to international law.
The illegality of the referendum
The Ukrainian perspective mitigates the illegality of the referendum itself. Ukraine alleges that “Only 34% of Crimeans wished to join Russia”[70]. After looking at polls before the annexation, which indicated that the inclusion into Russia was supported in Crimea by ‘41%’[71] is fully consistent with a May 2013 poll[72]. The data shows clear consistency between 2013 and 2014 with the poll only being a year apart, thus denoting its legitimacy. The claim of ‘34%’ is similar to that of the 2013/2014 poll than the assured 96.77% figure, ultimately showing its falsity. However, the 2013 figure was only a forecast and not an actual figure . Although just a claim, this idea would again show the unsubstantiated and false image of ‘legitimacy’ that Russia wish to conceive, which delegitimises its claim.
Similarly, the referendum was “conducted under great pressure”[73], having been concluded in only “two weeks’ time”[74]. This alludes to the fact that Russia wished to avoid Western inspection into the validity of the referendum. Similarly, Russia only allowed two proposals in the referendum vote[75]. It was either secede from Ukraine or change Crimea’s constitution entirely[76]. by limiting the options available to voters, Russia affected the positive-sum result. This makes it illegal under international law, as Russia uses an ‘outdated theory on cessation’[77] by not validating Crimea legitimately rather than relying on a ‘simple referendum of people living in a contested territory’[78] which proves nothing. By creating a quick and discriminatory referendum Russia has disallowed Western or international bodies to disprove its legality, remaining the only state with formal evidence. The ‘West’ are therefore the ones with the ‘unsubstantiated’ claim of illegitimacy. Yet, Russia has done this with purpose, a purpose to remain legitimate by lack of evidence. Russia’s seemingly manipulative nature to evidence has shown the omission Russia has to be legitimate on moral terms. Shaping the referendum result does not give Russia permission to legitimately annex Crimea on either moral or legal grounds Legitimacy to Russia is a clear means of validating its international image whilst completing its own national geostrategic interests. This is backed by the different claims which offer no clear legality or moral legitimacy upon greater inspection but offer undeniable, yet unsubstantiated influencing factors, such as the self-defence of its citizens and the ‘right to self-determination’.
The West’s past failures in interventionism have provided Russia with the moral argument of ‘everybody does it’[79]. The West’s hypocritical nature has ultimately allowed Russia the guise to annex Crimea without seeming undeniably illegitimate. Yet, ‘pointing fingers’ does not legitimise their claim any further but only accuses. Russia’s clear acknowledgement of international law shows its recognition of international ‘legitimacy’, but the premise of its claims being unsubstantiated fundamentally delegitimises Russia’s actions.
Russia’s claims for the annexation of Crimea are largely shaped by Russia’s ability to overgeneralise its claims in order to legitimise its actions to international law. As seen via the overgeneralisation of demography and the illegal referendum in Crimea, Russia’s claims are largely superficial. In many ways, it’s the interpretation of international law that legitimises its campaign. The West’s unsubstantiated perspective on the claims’ truths and the West’s previous failures in interventionism give Russia the guise to act in national interests without seceding moral ground. Legitimacy may, therefore, be defined as a subjective concept. Most crucially, however, Russia’s claims lacked substantiated evidence and, upon greater review are largely manipulated to suit its ‘legitimacy’. Even upon evaluation of Russian sources who show bias, Russia is illegitimate in annexing the Crimean Peninsula.
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